Friday 25 February 2011

INTIFADA BEYOND PALESTINE ASPIRATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE

ASPIRATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE

INTIFADA BEYOND PALESTINE

By ISMAEL HOSSEIN-ZADEH

Remember the neoconservatives’ plan of “domino effect” following the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq? It was supposed to be followed by the toppling of other “unfriendly” heads of “rogue states” such as those ruling Iran and Syria who do not cater to the US-Israeli interests in the Middle East. It was not meant to threaten the “friendly” regimes that rule Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain and their cohorts that have been firmly aligned with the United States. Indeed, it was supposed to replace the former type of “noncompliant” regimes with the latter type of “client states” that would go along with the US-Israeli geopolitical designs in the region.

Barely a decade later, however, the political winds in the Middle East are shifting in the opposite direction: it is not the US-designated “rogue states” that are falling but the “moderate American friends” who are crumbling. How do we explain this truly historical twist of fortunes?

A number of important factors that are clearly contributing to the breathtaking social upheavals in the Arab/Muslim world are economic hardship, dictatorial rule and rampant corruption. While these relatively obvious factors are frequently cited as driving forces behind the upheaval, a number of equally important but less evident forces are often left out of this list of contributory influences. These rarely mentioned factors include: aspirations to national sovereignty, frustration with the brutal treatment of the Palestinian people, and outrage by the malicious smear campaign against the Arab/Muslim people’s religious and cultural values. In other words, the Arab/Muslim people are not just angry with government repression, corruption, and economic hardship; they are also angry with their rulers’ subordination to or collusion with imperialism, both US imperialism and the (mini) Israeli imperialism, as well as with the insidious offenses against their religious and cultural heritage.

The overwhelming majority of the Arab/Muslim people who are up in arms against the status quo harbor a strong sense of humiliation by the fact that they are ruled by tyrannical heads of state who subordinate their interests to the economic and geopolitical imperatives of foreign powers. Equally demeaning to this people is the brutal treatment of the Palestinian people. The creation of the colonial settler state of Israel through terrorization, ethnic cleansing and eviction of at least 750,000 Palestinians from their homes, and the continued violence perpetrated daily against this people is viewed by the Arab/Muslim people as a degrading violence against them all.

Corporate media and mainstream political pundits in the United States tend to deny or downgrade the galvanizing role that anti-imperialism/anti-Zionism plays in the uprising. For example, the New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman recently opined (in a February 16, 2011, column): “Egypt has now been awakened by its youth in a unique way – not to fight Israel, or America, but in a quest for personal empowerment, dignity and freedom.” Obviously, Mr. Friedman must have a very narrow and unusual definition of dignity and freedom—as if such universally-cherished values are unrelated to foreign domination of one’s government or country.

The fact remains, however, that aspirations to national sovereignty and sentiments of anti-imperialism play important roles in the uprising. They explain why the unrest cuts across a wide swath of society. Not only the economically hard-pressed poor and working classes but also the relatively well-off middle classes are joining the youth in the streets. Professional strata such as lawyers, doctors and teachers, as well as people from the arts and intellectual life are joining too.

Just as the thrust of the Palestinian Intifada (uprising) is to end the Zionist occupation of their land, so does the more widespread unrest in the Arab/Muslim world represent a broader intifada designed to end the imperialist domination of their governments. Indications of such sentiments were reflected in many views and slogans in Cairo's Liberation Square, which were directed not only at Mubarak’s regime but also at the United States and Israel:

“We are not with America or any other government. We are able to help ourselves. . . . We are against the US interfering in Egypt's establishment of a democratic government. We are against any foreign interference. . . . We are Egyptians and we can decide our fate on our own. . . . “I don't think that Israel is a state. I don't believe in it. Israel is just an occupation. I personally, as an Egyptian, do not acknowledge the existence of Israel. Any Arab government that deals with Israel or works under Israel I do not acknowledge it either”.

Such keen aspirations to independence from foreign influences led Graeme Bannerman, the former Middle East analyst on the US State Department Policy Planning Staff, to acknowledge (on National Public Radio, January 27, 2011) that “Popular opinion in the Middle East runs so against American policies that any change in any government in the Middle East that becomes more popular will have an anti-American and certainly less friendly direction towards the US which will be a serious political problem for us.”

An indication of how passionately the Arab street detests their leader’s catering to the US-Israeli interests, or how they resent the brutal treatment of Palestinians, is reflected in the fact that, according to a number of opinion polls, they have consistently expressed more respect for the Iranian leaders, who are neither Arab nor Sunni, than their Arab leaders—because, contrary to most Arab leaders, the Iranian leaders have (since the 1979 revolution) firmly stood their ground vis-à-vis the egotistical imperialist policies in the region.

Egyptian regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Anwar Sadat (before him) were especially despised for their subservience to the United States and Israel. From the time of its creation in 1948 until 1979 no Arab country recognized Israel as a legitimate state. In 1979, however, Egypt (under President Sadat) broke ranks with the rest of the Arab/Muslim world when he signed a “peace agreement” with Israel, which came to be known as the Camp David accord.

Although the accord was officially between Egypt and Israel, the United States was a key broker and the main partner. The US agreed to supply Egypt with substantial financial and military aid, amounting to nearly $2 billion a year, in return for its recognition of Israel and its compliance with the US-Israeli geopolitical and economic imperatives in the region. As Alison Weir, writer/reporter and the executive director of “If Americans Knew,” recently put it, by thus recognizing and normalizing its relation with Israel, “Egypt led the way for other nations to ‘normalize’ relations with the abnormal situation in Palestine.”

Since then Egypt has been a de facto ally of Israel, as well as bedrock of economic and geopolitical interests of the United States in the Middle East. It has opened its air, water and ground spaces to US armed forces. It has worked to coax or coerce governments and political forces in the region to comply with the US-Israeli interests. And it has served as a counter-balancing force against countries like Iran that defy the imperialist plans of the United States and Israeli in the region. As a “peace partner” with Israel, Egypt has also been complicit in Israel’s colonial policies of vicious oppression of the Palestinian people.

Although under the US-Israeli influence, Anwar Sadat was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (along with Prime Minister Begin of Israel), for the Camp David “peace” accord, proponents of Egypt’s national sovereignty and defenders of the rights of the Palestinian people considered the accord as treason and capitulation to Zionist expansionism and US imperialism.

The outrage that the Camp David betrayal generated in Egypt and the broader Arab/Muslim world was epitomized by the tragic assassination of Anwar Sadat, presumably for having signed the giveaway “peace” accord with Israel. The following is one of many accounts that attribute Sadat’s assassination to the “peace” agreement:

“In the months leading up to his assassination, he was hugely unpopular in the Middle East for making peace with Israel, which was considered a 'traitorous' move against the Palestinians. There were several criticisms and death threats made against him and his family.


“It was no surprise to many that he was assassinated, but the circumstances under which he was assassinated are still peculiar. Many reports have claimed that Egyptian Security forces knew well in advance that an attempt on Sadat's life would be made, but did little to stop it. Some even claimed that Egyptian Security forces helped train the would-be assassins. Some see this as a plausible scenario, since the assassins were able to bypass several layers of checks and inspections prior to the military parade in Cairo”.

While President Reagan lamented Sadat’s death when he bemoaned: "America has lost a great friend, the world has lost a great statesman, and mankind has lost a champion of peace," Nabil Ramlawi, a Palestinian official at the time, stated: "We were expecting this end of President Sadat because we are sure he was against the interests of his people, the Arab nations and the Palestinian people".

An often latent goal of the current uprising in the Middle East/North Africa is to end the suffering of the Palestinian people by restoring their geopolitical rights within the internationally agreed upon borders. In subtle or submerged ways, the atrocious injustice perpetrated against Palestinians seems to be the “mother” of all the Arab/Muslim grievances. Viewed in this light, the uprising in the Arab/Muslim world represents an expanded intifada beyond Palestine. Without a fair and just resolution of the plight of the Palestinian people, the political turbulence in the region is bound to continue, with potentially cataclysmic consequences.

Once source of hope in the face of this gloomy picture is that more of the Jewish people would come to the realization that the expansionist project of radical Zionism is untenable and, therefore, join many other Jewish individuals and organizations (such as Jews for Justice for Palestinians) that have already come to such an understanding, and are working toward a just and peaceful coexistence with their historical cousins in the region.

Radical Zionism pins its hope for the success of its project on the support from imperialist powers. As has been pointed out by the critics of Zionism, many of whom Jewish, this is a very dangerous expectation, or hope, since the support from imperial powers, which is ultimately based on their own nefarious geopolitical calculations and economic interests, can precipitously come to an end, or drastically withdrawn, as the geopolitical equations in the region change. As the renowned Jewish thinker Uri Avnery recently put it:

“Our future is not with Europe or America. Our future is in this region. . . . It’s not just our policies that must change, but our basic outlook, our geographical orientation. We must understand that we are not a bridgehead from somewhere distant, but a part of a region that is now – at long last – joining the human march toward freedom.”

To sum up, the long pent-up grievances of the Arab/Muslim world are exploding not just in the faces of local dictators such as Mubarak of Egypt or Ben Ali of Tunisia but, perhaps more importantly, against their neo-colonial / imperial patrons abroad. As the astute foreign policy analyst Jason Ditz recently pointed out, “the resentment is spreading beyond Mubarak and his immediate underlings, and toward the United States and Israel.” This means that the uprising represents something bigger than the buzzwords of abstract, decontextualized personal freedoms, or the money-driven, carefully-scripted bogus elections – called democracy. It represents a growing culture of resistance to neo-colonialism that started with the great Iranian revolution of 1979.




WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE MAD COLONEL

By Eugene Robinson

President Obama pledged that “the entire world is watching” the horror in Libya, but watching isn’t nearly enough. There is much more that world leaders—beginning with Obama—urgently must say and do.

The world’s censure means nothing to Col. Moammar Gadhafi, the dictator who vows to die rather than surrender the power he has held for four decades. At this point, the long-running debate about whether Gadhafi is mostly diabolical or mostly deranged is irrelevant. Despite his incoherent ramblings, he clearly is fighting not just for power but for his life.

The forces still allied with Gadhafi—his sons, parts of the military establishment, the mercenaries he has imported from other African countries—know that they are fighting for their lives too. They have opened fire with heavy weapons against unarmed protesters. They have trained sniper fire on peaceful funeral processions. They have terrorized urban neighborhoods with random gunfire designed to make people cower in their homes rather than join the uprising. If Gadhafi’s forces are defeated, the people’s retribution will be definitive and brutal.

I should say when Gadhafi’s forces are defeated, because ultimately the tyrant is playing a losing hand. He’s playing it skillfully, though, having managed to establish a relatively secure bastion in Tripoli. His message to the brave rebels who now control the eastern part of the country is: Come and get me.

Gadhafi appears to still control many of the country’s military assets. Ragtag bands of insurgents are no match for modern jet fighters or helicopter gunships or naval vessels that can bombard coastal population centers from miles offshore. Eventually, the people will surely win. But it is likely that thousands have already died—and abundantly clear that Gadhafi, even in a losing cause, is prepared to commit murder on a genocidal scale.


Gadhafi seems to have calculated that the longer he can drag out the conflict—and demonstrate that he still commands the capital city and a potent, if diminished, military force—the more likely it becomes that he can find some way to survive.

That’s where Obama and other world leaders come in. The immediate aim should be to separate Gadhafi from as much of his military strength as possible.

On Wednesday, in his first extended remarks on the crisis, Obama warned that “the Libyan government has a responsibility to refrain from violence.” Those words, while correct, were far too weak. Obama should state plainly that we no longer consider Gadhafi’s regime to be the legitimate government of Libya and that the dictator must immediately step down.

This will not have the slightest impact on Gadhafi, of course. But the message isn’t for the Mad Colonel, it’s for the military officers—the pilots of his warplanes and commanders of his warships—who must decide whether to follow his orders. They need to be told, in no uncertain terms, that if they side with Gadhafi they will suffer the consequences.

And those consequences need to be spelled out. A chorus of world leaders should make clear that those who commit war crimes, such as firing on civilians, will personally be held accountable. If the avenging mob doesn’t get them, international justice will.

The United States should lead NATO in immediately declaring a no-fly zone for Gadhafi’s military aircraft and announcing that Libyan airspace is being monitored for violations. You wouldn’t attempt to enforce such a ban immediately. The idea, again, should be to influence those who must choose whether to follow Gadhafi’s orders.

By radio, television and the Internet, the U.S. and its allies should blanket Libya with the message that the Gadhafi regime has forfeited any right to legitimacy. Libyans should have no doubt about where we stand.

Such actions will anger the leaders of autocratic regimes that have been reliable allies of the West, such as Saudi Arabia. The Chinese government may not be pleased at such “interference,” and the Russians may not be thrilled, either. But Gadhafi is a special case, as anyone who has seen his recent appearances can attest. The umbrella? The rambling, delusional speeches about how the protesters are on drugs? The vow to kill or be killed? This man is either a psychopath or a sociopath, but not a statesman.

Unambiguous, muscular words and credible threats are the least we can do for the people of Libya. Even by that low standard, we are falling woefully short.



OIL, ARMS AND THE IMPERIAL ENTERPRISE IN NORTH AFRICA

OIL, ARMS AND THE IMPERIAL ENTERPRISE IN NORTH AFRICA









OIL, ARMS AND THE IMPERIAL ENTERPRISE IN NORTH AFRICA

The Business of Business in Libya

By TARECQ AMER

Another North African country is in the throes of revolution, causing yet more confusion and consternation among western leaders. One can only imagine the chagrin these Europeans and U.S. American progenitors of universal morals feel as they woke up only to see another despotic investment (this time in the form of odd-ball dictator Muammar Qaddafi) fall to the wrath of his people. Money at risk, investments troubled, and cultivated relationships strained all under the hue and cry of popular uprisings that challenge the very foundations of neo-liberal capitalism. There is a clear and protracted state of confusion going on amongst these leaders. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (again) tries in vain to find the safest words to meet the moment of fury in the streets of Libya while not straying too far from the corporate demands for stability at any cost. Her boss, President Obama, hides away on Presidents' Day perhaps hoping that by tomorrow all this will have gone away and he can get back to soaring speeches and mesmerized crowds.

Alas, that is unlikely. The violence unleashed upon the people of Libya, in the streets of Benghazi, Tripoli, al Baida and beyond, could very well make Libya a long-term dilemma for Washington. The people who have suffered through four decades of psychotically messianic rule are not likely to forget the meek (and in some instances downright offensive) statements of the U.S.A. and Europe calling for restraint while fighter jets were dropping bombs on their heads.

But the stakes are high at this point and go well beyond the shores of Tripoli. Firstly, key member states of the European Union have made hefty investments in Libya in the last few years and there isn't a strong desire to have these investments disturbed. With moves over the last decade to be re-admitted into the so-called global community, Qaddafi's Libya has caught the attention of nations and business. The 2004 application to the World Trade Organization, odd diplomatic feints such as suggesting a combined Jewish-Palestinian state called Isratine, and political posturing calling for a unified African nation are Qaddafi's attempts to move Libya away from its revolutionary image of the 1970s and 1980s.

Secondly, natural resources have facilitated these rebranding attempts. Libya's vast oil reserves make it a critical player globally simply because any interruption in supply would have a dramatic ripple effect on economies worldwide. Indeed, we are already beginning to see this at the gas-pump. And lastly, though he may be a disdainful bed partner, to send Qaddafi out the door now would simply add confidence to popular movements in more acceptable client states, thereby leading to the instability (also known as representative rule) that our Secretary of State so clearly dreads. This, at any rate, was the logic that seemed to guiding the brooding diplomats of the United States and Europe until a few days ago. There is likely to be a significant change of course simply because the level of carnage has exceeded the level of acceptability and could prove to be a far more destabilizing factor. That aside, let's now take a look at some key examples that highlight the once enviable position of Muammar Qaddafi in the geopolitical arena.

Italy currently receives 20% of its total oil imports from their former North African colony. This fact alone explains the despicable action of the Italian government over the last three days, as well as its willingness to be as evasive in condemning Qaddafi's violence as their prime minister is in letting the world know why he has a penchant for paying underage prostitutes for sex. Just days ago, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, echoing the words of comfort given by his Prime Minister to Qaddafi, stated, "We should not give the wrong impression of wanting to interfere, of wanting to export our democracy. We have to help, we have to support the peaceful reconciliation."

Perhaps, hearkening back to the brutal days of Italian colonial expeditions in Libya, he forgot that people rarely seek peaceful reconciliation with those who are comfortable with mowing down fellow citizens with 50 caliber machine gun rounds. Now granted, the Italians are apt to take a not-too-terribly-clever passive stance if for no other reason than they have a lot of money riding on the survival of Qaddafi. Oil imports at that scale make a brutal strongman an asset, if he is able to keep the oil flowing. That, though, is the ultimate unknown and we may well see Signor Frattini change his song before long as tribes in the oil-rich south of Libya begin to side with anti-government protesters, thereby threatening oil production.

Now to Britain. First on the list of Britain's new love affair with the Qaddafi regime is the central role of oil. In recent times, former Prime Minister Tony Blair has become something of a Qaddafi fan, with multiple visits with the Madman of North Africa over the past few years, including one that was splashed all over the British headlines in June of last year. What Blair has been up to hasn't fully come to light, but his moves vis a vis the Libyan regime were certainly pleasing to the Board of British Petroleum. Lest we forget, Libya has some of the largest oil reserves on the African continent and the prospect of untethered access to them made the mouths of Big Oil water. For four decades, Qaddafi maintained a nationalized oil extraction and production industry, filling the coffers of the leader and his acolytes. But with the 21st Century came an attempted neo-liberal regime facelift. Three years ago, BP signed a substantial exploration deal with the Qaddafi regime, totaling 900 million USD. This was one of the first of many corporate deals that made western liberal democracies giddy with excitement. The flamboyant defender of the Palestinian cause was shedding the clothes of barbarism and coming to the light of free markets. Big oil now had access to huge reserves; lots and lots of money was to be had. This rapture has come to a screeching halt in the past few days. Odds are that BP executives have joined western leaders and diplomats in sweating bullets over the Libyan events. Strongman Qaddafi was a dream for them. His odd, cultish ways aside, he was meant to be a man who knew how to hold his people in check and did so quite well for 42 years.

These are the characteristics of a leader well suited for the rapacious bottom-feeders of global capital. But they also demand that the ugliness of business be kept tightly under wraps. In this regard, Qaddafi has failed spectacularly.

And then, of course, there are the arms traders. Since its formation, the Cameron government has had an arms dealers' version of a tupper-ware party with the Middle East's less savory dictators, including the selling of crowd control weapons to Libya. Here is the list of some lethal toys sold to Libya by the British, as reported by The Independent on February 18th: tear gas; crowd control and small arms ammunition; ammunition for wall- and door-breaching projectile launchers. Also included in the list was military infrared and thermal imaging equipment, which one may suspect have been used by mercenary snipers to target unarmed protesters over the past five nights. Qaddafi's brutality towards his subject may have sealed his fate, though.

Recent history has shown that Big Oil and western governments have a strong stomach for mercenaries, violence, and cruelty for the preservation of profits. But Heaven forefend that these acts come to light. Reports of fighter jets unleashed on the people of Libya and mercenaries roaming the capital expose the mockery that is European values. As these stories find their way to the webpages of Al Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN, we may see considerably stronger rhetoric and action coming from the houses of power in the west, all signs that Qaddafi has become bad for business. This, of course, doesn't mean that the struggle for justice in Libya is close to being over. Instead, they may have to fend off attempts to replace the Madman of North Africa with a slightly more constrained and manageable strongman.



ANATOMY OF EGYPT'S REVOLUTION (PART THREE)

ANATOMY OF EGYPT'S REVOLUTION (PART THREE)

How Democracy Could be Hijacked

By Esam Al-Amin

“After climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb.” --Nelson Mandela

January 25 was the date the Egyptian youth decided to launch their revolution. As the fear barrier was broken, Egyptians throughout the country and from all walks of life joined the protests by the millions. Their main chant for eighteen continuous days was ‘The people want the fall of the regime.’

On February 11 that demand was met in a twenty second address by the recently appointed Vice President Omar Suleiman. Appearing on state television, he declared that Hosni Mubarak had resigned from his thirty-year position, transferring his authority to a military council called the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

His brief statement epitomized the end of an era marked by vicious repression and corruption as well as the inauguration of a new era that all Egyptians have since been celebrating in the streets.

The military signified the last institution tied to the deposed regime that still retained the trust and confidence of the people. During the protests it declared neutrality between the people and the regime. Although it demonstrated some favoritism towards the former regime at critical junctures of the uprising, to its credit, it rejected the call by the deposed president to crack down on the demonstrators.

Insisting on their peaceful protests while focusing on their main demand, the pro-democracy revolutionaries did not take the bait of the deposed president by engaging in violence in response to the crackdown by the security forces. When the army was called to the streets, the public embraced it; frequently chanting ‘The people and the army are one.’

Subsequently the groups that participated in the revolution formed loose coalitions in order to articulate their demands. The main coalition of the January 25 revolution, which included the most active groups and parties, has presented 35 demands to the new military rulers. These demands span all aspects of Egyptian life, including the political, constitutional, judicial, security, and economic levels.

Some of the most important demands encompassed the transfer of power from SCAF, which is ruling the country, to a transitional five-member civilian presidential council that would also include the head of the military; the dissolution of the lower and upper chambers of parliament; the dissolution of all provincial and local councils; the dissolution of the last government appointed by Mubarak, led by Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq; and the establishment of an elected and representative congress to write a new constitution.

Other demands include the release of all political prisoners- not only those who were arrested after Jan. 25 but also all political prisoners in Egyptian prisons, the end of the notorious state of emergency law, the dissolution of the state security apparatus that ruled the country through intimidation and fear, the dissolution of the ruling party and confiscation of its assets, investigation of all corrupt politicians and businessmen, including Mubarak and his sons, who systematically stole hundreds of billions of dollars, and putting them on trial, as well as firing all board chairmen and chief editors of the state print and electronic media who were cheering on the regime and deceiving the public through their massive propaganda operations.

In their first communiqués, the military rulers declared they would embrace, without elaboration, the demands of the revolution. But out of the three-dozen demands of the pro-democracy organizers, they have only explicitly supported three major demands in the first ten days while remaining vague on many others. Some pro-democracy leaders looked at the pace and scope of the reforms with cautious optimism, while others were alarmed and raised genuine concerns.

It was clear that behind the scenes the military forced Mubarak to resign, thus playing a crucial role in satisfying the main demand of the revolution. Subsequently, the military council embraced a much narrower agenda by favoring limited constitutional reform. It appointed some of the most respected constitutional scholars in the country to amend the constitution, addressing issues related to free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections, including limiting presidential terms.

But this was the same agenda announced by Mubarak before he resigned, a much less ambitious feat than the public’s demand for a new constitution. The difference was that the military, unlike Mubarak, selected credible judges and constitutional scholars who had no ties to the deposed president or his regime.

Another crucial demand carried out by the military council was the dissolution of the parliament, which the deposed regime fraudulently elected last November. Moreover, in order to diffuse some of the public anger, the military council called on the state prosecutor to arrest three former corrupt ministers and one senior ruling party leader as they are being investigated for massive financial and political corruption.

The prosecutor also banned dozens of other former ministers and oligarchs from foreign travel, as he announced massive investigations on huge sums of ill-gotten money, bribery, extortion, and other acts of economic and official corruption. It appears that the corrosive behavior of power and money during the Mubarak regime is promising to bring down some of the most powerful and wealthy people of Mubarak’s Egypt.

Much information that has appeared in the media since the downfall of Mubarak, show huge financial irregularities and corruption by the pillars of the former regime, reaching over a trillion dollars in one conservative estimate. For instance, many senior leaders of previous Mubarak governments, as well as ruling party leaders close to his son Gamal, acquired state lands or factories at rock bottom prices. In most transactions each individual made billions of dollars. Some even made in excess of $5 billion in one land deal.

However, bringing this class of people to justice would be a huge challenge and a critical test to the ultimate success of the revolution. After all, in the minds of most people revolutions are about rendering justice and punishing usurpers of the people’s rights and wealth.

Whether the investigations would be allowed to cover all corrupt individuals including the Mubarak family remains to be seen. If such investigations are allowed to proceed, they will represent significant indicators to the real independence and transparency of the military council.

Real challenge: Revolution vs. Counter-revolution

As the French revolution was unfolding at the end of the eighteenth century, French philosopher and diplomat Joseph de Maistre wrote, “The Counter-Revolution will not be a reverse revolution, but the reverse of a Revolution.” Likewise, the main challenge to Egypt’s revolution is that it could be hijacked by counter-revolutionaries, tied to the deposed regime, who would then reverse the revolution.

So what are the main challenges paused by counter-revolutionary forces facing the Egyptian revolution?

The dean of Arab journalists in the Middle East is Nasser-era Muhammad Hassanein Haykal. Banned from appearing on state television since the days of former President Anwar Sadat, he has recently sounded the alarm. He claimed in his first Egyptian television interview since the early 1970s that Mubarak, who is residing in his mansion at the Red Sea resort city of Sharm Al-Sheikh, has maintained contacts with the current Prime Minister that he appointed in early February. The implication is that he might be ruling by proxy.

If true, this would imply a huge betrayal of the people’s trust. Sharm Al-Sheikh gives Mubarak a huge advantage over his opponents. It is an isolated tourist destination by the Red Sea in the southern tip of the Sinai peninsula, where few Egyptians live, mainly servicing American, European and Israeli visitors.

Moreover, because of the restrictions placed on the Egyptians by the peace treaty with Israel, the army could not send more than 800 personnel into the entire peninsula. Most likely, there are more armed guards protecting Mubarak and his family at Sharm than that paltry number.

But the only way to limit any influence by Mubarak or his cronies on the future of the country is to purge his people from all positions of power or influence. This was the main theme of the more than three million demonstrators in Tahrir Square who came together one week after Mubarak’s ouster on Friday, February 18, celebrating ‘Victory Day.’

On that day the main chants of the demonstrators were, ‘The people demand to purify the regime,’ and ‘The people demand the values of the (Tahrir) Square,’ in a clear reference to revolutionary demands and ethics.

To purify the regime, the revolutionaries are demanding that the military council purge many institutions and dismiss many senior people tied to the previous regime. Otherwise, there will be a serious danger that the revolution could be hijacked –applying the same policies and corrupt practices albeit using different characters.

One of the foremost challenges, which the military council has been trying to avoid despite popular calls, is the dismissal of the central government and all the provincial governors, those officials appointed by Mubarak who showed intense loyalty to him through his final days.

Further, not only was the current government appointed by Mubarak a few days before he resigned, but many of its members, including the oil, information, labor, and health ministers were also known to be some of the most corrupt in the deposed regime.

Therefore the pro-democracy coalition is calling on the military council to declare a complete break from the previous regime and appoint an honest and capable individual to lead a transitional government until the elections, one that comprises a cabinet of technocrats, who were never part of any past Mubarak government.

But the military council has been wavering on this demand, preferring to bring about a limited reshuffle by replacing the most corrupt ministers, perhaps with some opposition members who were friendly with the previous regime. This is going to be a major test to the military council, signaling to the public their seriousness regarding the future direction of the country. Meanwhile, this challenge has been faced by the pro-democracy leaders of the coalition, formed to protect the revolution, by vowing to bring millions of people every Friday to Tahrir Square until this demand is met.

Perhaps the major challenges illustrating whether the military is serious about breaking from the past and embracing the goals of the revolution are in three crucial areas. The first challenge is at the security level. The main reason the deposed regime was able to control and dominate the political scene, and rule by instilling fear and repression is because of the state security apparatus, called the Mabahith. Until this apparatus is totally dismantled, there is a considerable threat that the revolution could be reversed, or at least hindered to the point of derailing its main objectives.

Secondly, major figures in the former ruling party, including major corrupt businessmen, are trying to regroup and re-brand themselves as a new pro-revolution and reform party, in an attempt to take over the levers of state power by manipulating the public, using the huge resources at their disposal, and through their internal knowledge of how state institutions operate. For example, the current government, in a plain effort to appease state employees, has offered each worker a fifteen per cent raise in order to carry favor and gain their support in any future elections.

Thirdly, none of the pro-regime media officials appointed by Mubarak to the numerous state print and electronic media boards or outlets, or heads of labor unions, have been dismissed. If allowed to stay in power, they would pose a very dangerous threat to genuine change since, as part of the previous regime, they have every incentive to promote their people to cover up all their corrupt behavior and practices, even as they falsely present themselves in the interim as reformers.

Another important test to SCAF’s seriousness with regard to the people’s demands is the lifting of the state of emergency law and allowing the unhindered formation of political parties. There are many manifestations of this law that stifle personal, civil, and political freedoms. For instance, under this law people could administratively be detained by the government without any charges for extended periods of time, or their houses searched without any judicial warrants.

Further, all universities are still controlled by the police, so that students could not organize their activities without the prying eyes of the state. The military council has already promised to lift the emergency law within six months. Fulfilling this promise is considered one of the most important signs to the realization of civilian and democratic rule.

An immediate impact of the revolution on the political system was this week’s judicial ruling on the formation of one of the political parties, the Wasat (or Middle), that has been fighting to come to existence since 1996. This time the Administrative Judicial System asserted its independence, voided the past ban, and ruled for it to legally operate. The previous regime fought against it for fifteen years because it was formed by former members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Meanwhile, the military council has promised to enact laws soon that would make formation of political parties easy and routine.

The role judges are likely to play in the future of Egyptian society will also be a clear indication of the direction of the country. If Egypt establishes a strong and independent judiciary, one whose decisions are respected and observed in society and not undermined by the executive branch, Egypt will then become the modern democratic state the revolution has called for.

This test will come to pass soon, as the next elections are scheduled this year under the supervision of the judiciary. If it is able to assert its authority and administer the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections freely and fairly by truly reflecting the will of the people, then Egypt will have accomplished a major milestone along its path on becoming a democratic state.

In short, like all such moments in history, Egypt’s revolution faces great challenges. But perhaps the most important is whether the new Egypt will break from the grip of some elements of Mubarak’s regime trying desperately to cling to power and prevent real change. The military will certainly have a say on whether to go forward and propel true reforms, as demanded by the revolution, or slow down and besiege it to accommodate the interests of its opponents.

In addition, a central challenge to the revolution will be the external pressures applied by international and regional powers to safeguard their interests and policies, which may diverge from or have a direct conflict with the interests and wishes of the vast majority of the people of Egypt. For instance, Egyptians overwhelmingly want to lift the siege on Gaza that the deposed regime helped maintain. They also want to help the various Palestinian factions reach a re-conciliation and end their division. Both objectives are strongly opposed by the U.S. and Israel.

Hence, the assertion of Egypt’s independence in the face of certain immense Western pressures would represent the ultimate test to the success of this revolution. If the future government of Egypt truly reflects the will of its people in internal as well as external policies, then the revolution has indeed succeeded. If not, then somewhere along the way counter revolutionary elements would have hijacked it, setting the stage for another corrective revolution.

Only the vigilance of the revolutionary forces in society and insistence on achieving their main objectives will determine the destiny of Egypt’s revolution. As it started in Tahrir Square on January 25, Egypt’s revolution might be destined to stay in Tahrir Square for some time until every challenge has met its response and every objective has become a reality.

In his farewell address in 1837, President Andrew Jackson said it best when he reminded his people that “eternal vigilance by the people is the price of liberty,” and that one “must pay the price” in order “to secure the blessing.”